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ABSTRACT 
THE EFFECTS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT ON COMMUNITY BANKS 
HOANH LE 
2017 
In this paper, I study the effects on community banks of seven final rules 
associated with the Dodd-Frank Act. I use quarterly data on US bank holding 
companies from 1991 through 2016 to test working hypotheses that several bank-
performance measures—including pretax returns on assets, loans per employee, 
changes in the number of employees, and salaries to assets—responded to the passage 
of these seven final rules in ways that reflected regulatory burdens that these rules 
imposed on banks. I find that these seven final rules affected banks differently 
according to their scale. Taken together, my results imply that these seven final rules 
mostly burdened community banks with $10 billion or less in total assets; put 
differently, these rules imposed relatively little regulatory burden on large banks with 
greater than $10 billion in total assets.
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The banking industry plays an important role in the US financial system and the 
US economy, more generally. Annually, banks supply about $10 trillion of credit in 
the United States; thus, banks are an important source of external funding for US 
businesses. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the US government heavily regulates the 
banking industry to ensure it works efficiently and does not fail.  
Financial regulation seeks to prevent banks from taking excessive risks and to 
protect consumers from losses. Banking regulations include safety and soundness 
regulation and consumer protection regulation. The purpose of safety and soundness 
regulation is to stabilize the banking system and avoid failure while ensuring banks 
are profitable. On the other hand, the purpose of consumer protection regulation is to 
protect depositors from losing their savings if a banking panic occurs. Since the Great 
Depression (1929-1933), a great deal of financial legislation has been passed; 
examples include the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, the Securities Acts of 1933, the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Competitive Equality in Banking Act (CEBA) 
of 1987, and the Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act of 2001 (PATRIOT). The latest example is the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act). All of legislations, 
which include the Dodd-Frank Act, added up to more than 22,000 pages of 
regulations.   
The Dodd-Frank Act was passed in July 2010 by policymakers who sought to 
prevent a banking crisis like the one that occurred in 2008. There are many reasons to 
expect that the significant changes in financial regulations associated with the Dodd-
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Frank Act have increased costs for banks, especially community banks, which do not 
benefit from economies of scale.  
 
This expectation has led some financial-system observers to conclude that 
regulations for small banks and large banks should differ.  To be sure, the authors of 
the Dodd-Frank Act intended to target the largest financial institutions; thus, much of 
the Dodd-Frank Act is not intended to apply to community banks—generally 
speaking, those with total assets of less than $10 billion.  Although community banks 
are exempted from many of the Act’s rules, there remains much debate over the 
regulatory burden the Act imposes—indirectly or otherwise—on community banks. 
In this thesis, I study the effects of regulations on community banks and test the 
central hypothesis that, compared to large banks, community banks are more 
constrained and, thus, burdened by regulations, specifically those associated with the 
Dodd-Frank Act.  Based on my review and analysis of the literature, I determine that 
seven Dodd-Frank rules—mortgage and non-mortgage related—should have the 
largest impact on community banks. I measure the impact of these seven final rules on 
measures of bank performance—namely, loans per employee, pretax returns on 
assets, percentage change in number of employees, and salaries to assets—across 5 
groups of banks, which I define based on asset size.  My dataset includes more than 
135,000 bank-quarter observations for the period from 1991 Q1 to 2016 Q4.  I 
obtained these data from the Federal Reserve’s Consolidated Financial Statements for 
Holding Companies (FR-Y9C) reports. 
Taken together, my results imply that the effects of mortgage and non-mortgage 
related rules on bank performance vary according to bank size.  Specifically, these 
seven final rules mostly affect community banks with $10 billion or less in total 
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assets; thus, these rules impose relatively little regulatory burden on large banks with 
greater than $10 billion in total assets. 
Chapter 2: AN OVERVIEW OF COMMUNITY BANKING 
Community banks are known for their traditional banking activities and 
regional-market concentrations. Community banks generate revenue from loans they 
make to households and business—often, small business in sectors such as 
agriculture, real estate, and retail. Typically, a community bank is defined by the 
amount of its total assets. Nevertheless, the three largest federal banking regulators 
define community banks differently. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System defines a community bank as an institution with less than $10 billion in total 
assets. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) defines a community 
bank as an institution with less than $1 billion in total assets and includes some 
limited-purpose chartered institutions (2010). Finally, in a 2012 study, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) also defined a community bank as an 
institution with less than $1 billion in total assets; though, the FDIC included or 
excluded institutions as it deemed appropriate based on special-case features—
including, for example, the extent to which an institution engages in basic banking 
activities and the institution’s geographical footprint. Based on the FDIC definition, 
94 percent of the 6,914 US financial institutions were community banks as of year-
end 2010 (FDIC, 2012). 
 Community banks play a crucial role in the US economy. As I report in Table 
1, at year-end 2016, community banks held only 18.05 percent of total banking 
industry assets while large banks held more than 80 percent of total banking industry 
assets. Nevertheless, community banks play an important role in the US economy, 
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especially in local economies. Community banks provide banking services to millions 
of Americans; these banks are a key source of credit for small business loans and rural 
communities, more generally.  
Table 1: Banking Industry Assets by Asset Size as of December 31, 2016 
($billion) 
 
Bank Size 
 
Assets (Billions) 
Asset Distribution Across 
Bank Size 
Less than $100 Million 92 0.55% 
$100 Million to $1 Billion 1,174 7.00% 
$1 Billion to $10 Billion 1,762 10.50% 
$10 Billion to $250 Billion 5,306 31.62% 
Greater than $250 Billion 8,447 50.34% 
Source: FDIC 
As of 2015, community banks provided about 77 percent of loans to the 
agricultural industry, 46 percent of loans to the commercial real estate market, and 51 
percent of loans to small businesses (Lux & Greene, 2015). Community banks mostly 
serve rural communities. According to the FDIC, community banks locate their 
offices in local areas four times more than non-community banks do (FDIC, 2012). 
As former Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke stated in his speech on March 14, 
2012: 
Community banks remain a critical component of our financial system and our 
economy. They help keep their local economies vibrant and growing by taking 
on and managing the risks of local lending, which larger banks may be 
unwilling or unable to do. They often respond with greater agility to lending 
requests than their national competitors because of their detailed knowledge of 
the needs of their customers and their close ties to the communities they serve. 
 
In Table 2, I report the distribution of community banks by asset size as of 
December 31, 2016. The largest category, which accounts for 51.3 percent of total 
community banks, includes banks with total assets from $100 million to $500 million; 
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the next largest category, which accounts for 26.57 percent of total community banks, 
includes banks with total assets less than $100 million. Banks with total assets from 
$500 million and $1 billion account for 11.42 percent of community banks; the 
remainder includes banks with assets from $1 billion to $10 billion.   
Table 2: Community Banks by Asset Size 
Size of Community Bank Number of 
Community Banks 
Percent of Total 
Community Banks 
Total Assets 
(In 000’s) 
Percentage of Total 
Bank Assets 
Less than $100 million  
$100 million to $500 million 
1,541 
2,975 
26.57% 
51.30% 
91,516,049 
705,441,247 
3.02% 
23.30% 
$500 million to $1 billion 662 11.42% 468,501,015 15.47% 
$1 billion to $10billion 
Total  
621 
5,799 
10.71% 
100% 
1,762,210,918 
3,027,699,229 
58.21% 
100% 
Source: FDIC - Statistics on Depository Institutions Report as of December 31, 2016 
Community banks distinguish themselves by relying heavily on personal 
relationships. Hein, Koch, and Macdonald (2005) define community banks as those 
that focus their activities, such as lending and gathering deposits, on local 
communities rather than on regional or national markets; thus, community banks are 
generally small. Marsh and Norman (2013) characterize the importance of community 
banks as follows:  
Community banks play a vital role in this nation’s economy, particularly with 
respect to small businesses and rural communities, and their continued health 
and vitality is central to the nation’s economic recovery. Community banks 
provide 48.1 percent of small-business loans issued by US banks, 15.7 percent 
of residential mortgage lending, 43.8 percent of farmland lending, 42.8 percent 
of farm lending, and 34.7 percent of commercial real estate loans, and they held 
20 percent of all retail deposits at US banks as of 2010. 
 The economic evidence suggests that community banks remain healthy, based 
on measurements ranging from lending growth to geographical reach. Figure 1 
illustrates quarterly pretax return on assets by bank type. Before the financial crisis, 
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quarterly pretax return on assets of community banks was around 1.4 percent, on 
average. During the financial crisis, quarterly pretax return on assets dropped 
dramatically. This return improved after the financial crisis, although the rate 
remained lower than before the crisis.  
Source: FDIC 
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Source: FDIC 
Figure 2 illustrates quarterly pretax return on equity by bank type. Over the 12-
year period between 2005 and 2016, community banks generated average quarterly 
pretax return on equity of 8.69 percent, compared to 11.35 percent for non-
community banks. For the period from 2005 to 2007, community banks generated 
average quarterly pretax return on equity of 13.72 percent, compared to 16.65 percent 
for non-community banks. For the period from 2007 to 2010, average quarterly return 
on equity deteriorated for both community banks and non-community banks; this 
return remained negative from 2009 to 2010. Since then, bank profitability has 
recovered; though, average quarterly pretax return on equity for all banks has settled 
to a level lower than that before the crisis.   
  Qualified loans and local deposits are the main ingredients of community-
bank asset transformation and, thus, growth. The total volume of loans held by 
community banks peaked in 2008, dropped during the financial crisis, and troughed in 
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2011 (Corner & Meyer, 2013). Community banks accounted for 22 percent of bank 
loans in 2014 (Lux & Greene, 2015). Total loans were $530 billion in 2015 and $466 
billion in 2016, accounting for 6.8 percent and 5.3 percent of loan growth, 
respectively. The growth of community-bank loans is stronger than the growth of 
bank loans in general. In 2016, loan growth at community banks was 8.3 percent, 
driven largely by commercial real estate loans, commercial and industrial loans, and 
residential mortgages. Moreover, community banks accounted for 43 percent of the 
banking industry’s small loans to businesses and the growth of these loans is faster 
than that of all other types of loans (Speeches & Testimony, Feb 2017). 
Community banks engage in relationship lending. Officers, who specialize in 
collecting soft information about local customers and forming strong relationships 
with families, small businesses, and farmers, make most lending decisions. The 
Council of Economic Advisers (2016) indicates that community banks provide 
banking services to millions of Americans; the banks are often the only local source 
of banking services for many counties, and the main credit source for rural 
communities and small businesses. About 1 in 4 counties rely on community banks 
for brick-and-mortar banking services; almost half of rural counties contain only 
community banks, and around 10 percent of rural counties have only a single 
community bank office (Council of Economic Advisers, 2016). Community banks 
play a vital role in the American economy because they provide a large percentage of 
financial services to the US economy, and because they are the only banks available 
to a third of US counties (Marsh & Norman, 2013).  
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Chapter 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The banking industry is one of the most heavily regulated industries in the 
United States (Elliehausen & Lowrey, 2000). After the financial crisis in 2008, 
policymakers feared another banking collapse would occur soon, so Congress quickly 
passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010 
(Dodd-Frank Act). Its framers intended to promote the stability of the financial 
system and to protect consumers. However, there is ongoing debate about whether the 
additional regulations have resulted in greater regulatory burden for small banks, even 
though they were not the source of the financial crisis. Regulations have both benefits 
and costs, but the most frequent critique is that “one-size-fits-all” regulations have 
negatively affected small banks most severely. Some advocates of this view suggest 
that small banks should be exempted from regulations because the costs of regulations 
on small banks do not justify the benefits. Moreover, the costs of regulations not only 
affect small banks, but also affect consumers, the government, and the overall 
economy. For instance, the ability-to-repay rule in the Dodd Frank Act requires the 
lender to verify the ability of the borrower to repay the mortgage before the lender 
may provide the mortgage. To do that, banks must spend more time considering the 
application; they also must spend time and money training their staff to apply more 
rigorous lending-decision rules. Thus, this additional regulation may have increased 
both the operating and opportunity costs of small banks. Large banks benefit from 
economies of scale because they can spread their fixed costs over a large customer 
base. Small banks, which do not benefit from economies of scale, are affected more 
when regulations increase operating costs. The literature supports the existence of 
economies of scale in complying with banking regulations, and the asymmetrically 
distributed effects of regulations across the banking industry. 
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This literature review includes three sections: regulations on financial 
institutions, economies of scale in the banking industry, and the effects of the Dodd-
Frank Act on community banks.  
3.1. Studies on banking regulations and regulatory burdens  
 
Banking regulation can be divided into two categories: safety and soundness 
regulation and consumer protection regulation. Safety and soundness regulation is 
designed to ensure that banks maintain profitability and avoid failure. Consumer 
protection regulation is designed to ensure the rights of consumers, protect consumers 
in the financial marketplace, and prevent consumers from unfair, fraudulent business 
practices. As I report in Table 3, banks are assigned one of three federal regulators 
based on their charter and corporate structure (Hoskins & Labonte, 2015).  
Table 3: Federal Prudential Regulators of the Banking Industry 
Primary Regulator Banking Institution Supervised 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)  State banks that are not members of Federal 
Reserve System 
Federal Reserve (Fed) Bank holding companies, state banks that are 
members of Federal Reserve System 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) National banking associations 
 
Regulatory burden is a concern of both bankers and policymakers whenever 
new legislation is passed. Researchers and policymakers use different methods to 
measure the impacts of regulations on the banking industry and on the US economy. 
There are many studies on banking regulation and its effects on banks’ cost structures. 
Compliance cost is an important measure of regulatory burden, and researchers find 
that this cost can be substantial. According to the study of regulatory burden 
conducted by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (1992), annual 
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compliance costs represent up to 14 percent of total noninterest expenses of the 
banking industry. Franks, Schaefer, and Staunton (1998) examined the direct and 
compliance costs of financial regulations in the UK financial system. They found that 
total regulatory costs on average accounted for 2.4 percent of net operating costs in 
securities firms; more specifically, 0.5 percent of costs was the direct payment to 
regulators and 1.9 percent of costs was due to compliance—in the forms of staffing, 
training, legal, and reporting compliance. They also found that total regulatory costs 
on average accounted for 5.8 percent of net operating costs in investment 
management firms; more specifically, 1 percent of costs was the direct payment to 
regulators and 4.8 percent of costs was due to compliance. Dahl, Meyer, and Neely 
(2016) find that compliance costs comprise more than 8 percent of total noninterest 
expenses at banks with total assets less than $100 million, and that compliance costs 
comprise 2.9 percent of total noninterest expenses at banks with total assets between 
$1 billion and $10 billion.   
When financial legislation is passed, the question arises as to whether the 
legislation increases regulatory burden on financial institutions. Typically, researchers 
examine this issue by investigating the impacts of financial legislation on measures of 
compliance costs and bank performance. Dolar and Shughat (2007) investigate the 
effects of regulation—specifically, anti-money laundering provisions of the Patriot 
Act—on the banking and thrift industries by comparing the total noninterest expenses 
before and after the Patriot Act.  The total noninterest expenses—including 
managerial and employee compensation, equipment expenses, training expenses, 
professional and outside services, travel and conference expenses, supply expenses, 
and overhead expenses—proxy for regulatory compliance costs. Their dataset 
contains 150,722 observations on US commercial banks and thrifts from 1992 to 
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2005. The authors determine that after the Patriot Act went into effect, on average, US 
financial institutions incurred 44.7 percent higher compliance costs. Another 
important finding from this study is that the compliance costs of Title III of the Patriot 
Act have fallen more heavily on small institutions than large institutions. Similarly, 
Pasiouras, Tanna, and Zopounidis (2009) investigate the impacts of regulations—
three pillars of Basel II—and banking activity restrictions on cost and profit 
efficiency of banks. Using stochastic frontier analysis on a sample that includes 2,853 
observations from 615 commercial banks over 74 countries during the period 2000-
2004, the authors find that regulations that impose stricter restrictions on banking 
activities result in a decline in cost efficiency. In addition, stricter capital 
requirements have a negative impact on profitability; thus, increasing capital 
requirements reduces banking profitability. Feldman et al. (2013) find similar results 
in their study, in which they quantify the cost of additional regulations on community 
banks. When new financial legislation is passed, banks may respond to the new 
legislation by increasing training staff and hiring additional staff to deal with 
compliance issues, both of which reduce profitability. Based on data from 2012, the 
authors find that hiring one additional employee to respond to an increase in 
regulation reduces return on assets by 23 basis points for the group of smallest 
community banks—those with total assets of less than $50 million—and nearly 13 
percent of this bank group would become unprofitable due to these regulatory 
changes.  
Most US regulations have been implemented in response to financial crises or 
other historical and political events. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act was passed in July 2010 in response to the financial crisis in 
2008, the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Many researchers and 
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bankers consider the Dodd-Frank Act the most comprehensive financial regulatory 
reform of the twenty-first century. Marsh and Norman (2013) argue that although the 
most significant regulations under the Dodd-Frank Act have not gone into effect, the 
act already imposes significant compliance costs on community banks. Put 
differently, compliance costs place community banks at a further competitive 
disadvantage to large banks. Marsh and Norman (2013) also argue that the number of 
community banks will continue to shrink because the regulatory burden of the Dodd-
Frank Act will cause additional failures or mergers. Based on a similar research 
question, Lux and Greene (2015) analyze the FDIC’s Statistics on Depository 
Institutions quarterly dataset to determine the effects of the Dodd-Frank Act on 
community banks. The authors find that community banks’ share of assets has fallen 
significantly—by over 12 percent—since the second quarter of 2010; the share of 
assets of the smallest community banks—those with assets less than $1 billion—has 
fallen 19 percent since the second quarter of 2010; and community banks’ market 
share of residential and commercial lending fell by 6 percent during the financial 
crisis and has fallen at a rate almost double that since 2010.  
The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City surveyed community banks with 
assets less than $1 billion and located in the Tenth District in 2014. According to the 
findings of the survey, community banks rate mortgage regulations as the most 
expensive and time consuming. These banks expected the number of full-time 
employees to increase by 37 percent over the next three years. Nearly 90 percent of 
respondents expected an increase in training expenses and technology upgrades over 
the next three years.  
The Mercatus Center at George Mason University surveyed nearly 200 small 
banks—those with total assets less than $10 billion—to study the effects of the Dodd-
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Frank Act on small banks. The authors conclude “small banks are spending more on 
compliance in the wake of Dodd-Frank.” Over 25 percent of small banks expected to 
hire additional compliance or legal personnel in the next 12 months. In particular, 
37.3 percent of respondents already hired new staff in order to meet the CFPB’s 
regulations, especially mortgage rules. 94 percent of respondents in the survey 
reported that they would not add any products as a result of Dodd-Frank. Moreover, 
some banks reported they discontinued products and services such as residential 
mortgages, mortgage servicing, home equity lines of credit, over-draft protections, 
and credit cards, as a result of Dodd-Frank. Overall, 82.9 percent of respondents 
reported that their compliance costs have increased more than 5 percent since the 
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act (Pierce et al., 2014). Hogan and Burns (2016) find a 
statistically significant increase in banks’ noninterest expenses, which include 
regulatory compliance costs, after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act.  
Cyree (2015) used a quantitative analysis approach to measure the direct 
compliance costs of banks around major regulatory changes from 1991 to 2014. The 
author analyzed data from the Federal Reserve FR-Y9C reports for bank holding 
companies from 1991 Q1 to 2014 Q1. The data included more than 133,000 bank-
quarter observations. The author rejects the hypothesis that major regulatory changes 
have no effects on the banking industry; however, the effects of these regulatory 
changes vary. Pretax return on assets of community banks fell significantly in relation 
to the Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Rule, while it rose significantly in 
relation to the Patriot Act. Loans-per-employee fell in relation to the Patriot Act. In 
contrast, loans-per-employee rose in relation to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act 
and the Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Rule, which is inconsistent with the 
debate about regulatory burden over the Dodd-Frank Act.  
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On balance, the literature on regulatory burden on community banks finds that 
increasing regulations on financial institutions increases compliance costs (because 
banks must hire additional staff and spend more time dealing with new rules) and 
technological investments, and decreases banking services and profits. Moreover, the 
literature finds that regulatory burdens are disproportionally greater for small banks. 
3.2. The economies of scale in banking industry 
 
Between 1984 and 2008, the number of commercial banks in the US fell by 
more than 50 percent, from 14,482 to 7,086. Despite this fall, the average size of a 
commercial bank had increased five-fold in terms of total assets (Wheelock & 
Wilson, 2012). Changes in regulation and advances in information technology 
encouraged banks to grow large in order to exploit economies of scale (Berger & 
Mester, 2003). Large banks exploit economies of scale because of the decline in unit 
costs associated with increased bank size. A large bank can spread fixed costs over 
more borrowers, which results in a lower cost per customer (Hein, Koch & 
Macdonald, 2005). Theory also suggests banks should enjoy economies of scale 
because the credit risk of their loans, their portfolio of their financial services, and the 
liquidity risk of their deposits will grow more diverse as banks grow larger.  
Figure 3 illustrates noninterest expenses for community-bank groups. The 
smallest community bank group has the highest noninterest expenses as a percentage 
of average assets, while the largest community bank group has the lowest noninterest 
expenses.  
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Source: FDIC 
Economies of scale in the banking industry occur when banks can reduce the 
average cost of production as the quantity of output increases. Older studies did not 
find economies of scale existed in the banking industry except at very small banks; 
however, recent studies find evidence that economies of scale exist in the banking 
industry in general (Hughes & Mester, 2013). Berger and Mester (2003) find that 
during the period 1991 to 1997, banks operated under increasing returns to scale, such 
that providing additional services increased profitability. Analogously, Feng and 
Serletis (2010) find that increasing returns to scale exist in large banks. Wheelock and 
Wilson (2012) used the cost framework to estimate the returns to scale in the banking 
industry over the period from 1984 to 2006. These authors find that increasing returns 
to scale exist in most banking organizations. This can explain a part of the growth in 
average bank size through consolidation in the US banking industry.  
Berger et al. (2007) analyzed data from the US banking industry over the period 
1982 to 2000 and concluded that large, multimarket banks perform better than small, 
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single-market banks. Advances in technology make large, multimarket banks more 
competitive relative to small, single-market banks.  
Hughes and Mester (2013) analyzed 842 top-tier bank holding companies in the 
US in 2007 and found that economies of scale increase with bank size. For instance, a 
10 percent increase in output results in an 8.8 percent increase in costs for banks with 
total assets less than $800 million; while a 10 percent increase in output results in a 
7.5 percent increase in costs for banks with total assets over $100 billion.  
3.3. The effects of the Dodd-Frank Act on community banks 
 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank Act) was passed in July 2010 in response to the financial crisis of 2008. The 
Dodd-Frank Act is an 849-page bill with 16 titles and more than 250 new rules that 
span 11 agencies.  The Act addresses many issues that policymakers reason 
contributed to the financial crisis in 2008. The Dodd-Frank Act is perhaps the most 
comprehensive financial regulatory reform of the twenty-first century. As the full title 
of the Dodd-Frank Act reveals, the purpose of this Act is to “promote the financial 
stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the 
financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending 
bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other 
purposes.” By all accounts, the authors of the bill intended to target the largest 
financial institutions, which were mainly responsible for the 2008 financial crisis and 
which still pose systemic risks. Indeed, many of the provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act 
apply to the largest and most complex financial institutions. The Dodd-Frank Act 
creates new government agencies and authorizes agencies to adopt regulations to 
implement provisions of the Act. It establishes the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council (FSOC) to monitor the US financial system and to identify systemic risks. 
  
 
18
The FSOC includes 10 voting members and 5 non-voting members and is chaired by 
the Secretary of the Treasury. The FSOC collects information as well as monitors the 
financial services marketplace to identify potential risks to the US financial system.  
Additionally, the bill establishes the Office of Financial Research within the Treasury 
Department to support the FSOC by improving the accessibility of financial data and 
conducting research related to financial stability (GAO study, 2015). The Dodd-Frank 
Act also creates the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to supervise 
banks, and large non-banks such as credit reporting agencies and debt collection 
companies.  The responsibilities of the CFPB include ensuring consumers are 
provided clear information and protected from unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices, 
monitoring compliance with federal consumer law, ensuring consumer financial law 
is enforced appropriately and financial products and services are delivered 
transparently and efficiently (GAO study, 2015). While community banks are not 
examined by the CFPB, community banks are subject to the rules written by the 
CFPB.  
There is strong evidence that community banks did not cause the financial crisis 
of 2008 (Marsh & Norman, 2013). Marsh and Norman (2013) reason that community 
banks are not responsible for the financial crisis because these banks participated very 
little, if at all, in the three main causes of the financial crisis as determined by authors 
of the Dodd-Frank Act: namely, subprime lending, securitization, and derivative 
trading. From January 2003 to September 2012, community banks held only 0.2 
percent of total residential mortgages in default compared with 1.64 percent for all 
institutions. Additionally, between 2003 and 2010, community banks participated in 
only 0.07 percent of residential mortgage securitization activities and held only 0.003 
percent of all credit derivatives held by all banking institutions.  
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The Council of Economic Advisers (2016) found that community banks remain 
healthy and their services have grown in the years since the passage of the Dodd-
Frank Act. For example, the annual growth rate of lending by community banks 
increased between 3 and 9 percent in 2015. Moreover, there is no evidence that the 
Dodd-Frank Act resulted in a decline in access to banking services across counties; 
indeed, the average number of branches per community bank has increased (Council 
of Economic Adviser Issue Brief, 2016).  
The Dodd-Frank Act exempts institutions with $10 billion or less in total assets; 
thus, much of the Act is not intended to apply to community banks. Although 
community banks are exempted from many of the Act’s rules, there remains much 
debate over the regulatory burden the Act imposes—indirectly or otherwise—on 
community banks. Regulations can burden community banks by increasing operating 
and opportunity costs. Operating costs or compliance costs are the costs banks incur 
when complying with regulation, while opportunity costs are the costs banks incur by 
giving up business opportunities because of additional regulations. As Hoskins and 
Labonte (2015) state in their study, banks face regulatory burdens from new 
regulations because banks must train staff how to comply, spend more time reviewing 
loan applications, and hire additional compliance officers.  
Marty Reinhart, president of a $100 million community bank located in 
Wisconsin said the following about the effect that new regulations have had on 
residential mortgage lending:  
Extra forms with early disclosures and having to register and finger print 
mortgage loan officers, adds to costs associated with this type of lending. It 
creates delays, additional cost and confusion on the part of the borrower. A 
typical mortgage file will have more than 100 pages by the time the loan is 
closed.  
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In Figure 4, I present the primary drivers of increased compliance costs 
according to the 23rd real estate lending survey of the American Bankers Association 
(ABA, 2016). Time allocation, technology costs, and loss of efficiency are three 
primary factors that drive the increase in compliance costs. Besides those factors, 
personnel costs, third-party vendor services, paperwork and complexity of disclosure, 
loss of business lines, and increase in time between loan application and final loan 
approval also drive the increase in compliance costs.  
Source: ABA Real Estate Lending Survey, 2016 
 
Community bank customers have had difficulties obtaining loans after the 
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act because of mortgage related rules. According to a 
survey of the Independent Community Bankers Association in 2014, 73 percent of 
community bank members in the survey mention that regulations suppress mortgage 
lending (Community Bank Lending Survey, 2014). The survey of the Mercatus 
Center indicates 83 percent of small banks (those with less than $10 billion in assets) 
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report their compliance costs have increased more than 5 percent since the passage of 
the Dodd-Frank Act (Peirce et al., 2014). 
Chapter 4: DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1. Conceptual Framework 
 
The notion that regulatory burden varies across bank size is based on the 
principle of economies of scale: the average cost of a product or service falls as 
production (and thus bank size) rises. In section 3.2, I document evidence of the 
existence of economies of scale in the banking industry. Large banks benefit from 
economies of scale because they can spread their fixed costs—including, perhaps 
regulatory costs—across a large quantity of production, while small banks cannot do 
the same; all else equal, this results in greater regulatory burden for smaller banks. 
Regulatory-compliance costs are not matters of public record, because banks do 
not separately report the non-interest expenses associated with their compliance 
efforts. Nevertheless, if these efforts impose significant cost burdens (notably on 
smaller banks), these burdens should be reflected in various financial-statement 
measures of bank performance. I focus on four such conventional measures: namely, 
loans per employee, salaries to assets, percentage change in number of employees, 
and pre-tax returns on assets (Brewer and Russell, 2016; Cyree, 2015; GAO, 2015; 
Kupiec and Lee, 2012). 
Loans per employee is a measure of output that declines as banks’ regulatory 
burden increases. If mortgage lending at small banks were affected by mortgage 
related rules associated with the Dodd-Frank Act, these rules would likely increase 
cost of originating loans; thus, the mortgage lending would decrease, all else equal 
(GAO, 2015).  
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Salaries-to-assets is a measure of cost that increases as banks hire additional 
employees or replace employees with higher-priced compliance specialists to deal 
with changes in regulations.  According to a GAO (2015) study, banks may hire 
additional staff to deal with compliance issues. Similarly, Feldman et al. (2013) stated 
that when new legislation is passed, banks might respond by hiring additional staff to 
manage compliance with regulation. The change in the number of employees before 
and after the passage of regulatory events reveals whether regulations increase the 
regulatory burden on banks. The number of employees increases if regulations burden 
banks. 
Finally, to measure the effects of regulations on bank profitability, Brewer and 
Russell (2016) use return on assets (ROA) as a dependent variable. However, other 
studies suggest using pretax return on assets. According to Kupiec and Lee (2012), 
the pretax return on assets is a useful measure with which to compare the profitability 
of banks with similar business risk profiles. Additionally, pretax ROA is useful 
because many banks are S Corporations and, thus, do not pay federal income taxes; 
thus, pretax ROA is unaffected by whether and how banks are taxed (Cyree, 2015). 
Pretax ROA decreases if regulations burden banks. 
I model across banks and time the pattern of each performance measure as a 
function of bank-specific observable variables, unobserved effects, and dummy 
variables indicating the announcement or implementation dates associated with seven 
Dodd-Frank rules—those I reason apply, intentionally or otherwise, to community 
banks.  More formally, I estimate a model that takes the general form specified in 
Equation 1, where Yi,t is the performance measure for bank i at time t, Xi,t is a vector 
of observable variables that vary across banks i, across time t, or some combination of 
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both banks and time, αi is the unobserved heterogeneity across banks, δk is the dummy 
variable coefficient associated with rulek, and εi,t is the error term.    
 	
Y
i ,t
= βX
i ,t
+δ
1
rule
1
+δ
2
rule
2
+ ...+α
i
+ ε
i ,t
            (1) 
 
I am primarily interested in the δ coefficients on the dummy variables rule1, 
rule2, and so on. The model includes four dummy variables—namely, ORIGI, 
DEBIT, ESCR and RULE—associated with seven final rules. I expect the 
corresponding δ coefficients to be statistically significant and negative when Yi,t in 
Equation 1 is loans per employee and pretax return on assets; and I expect the 
corresponding δ coefficients to be statistically significant and positive when Yi,t is 
percentage change in the number of employees and salaries to assets.  
Mortgage and non-mortgage related rules associated with the Dodd-Frank Act 
Based on a GAO (2015) study, a guide prepared by the American Bankers 
Association (ABA; 2012) that identified 12 important issues of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
real estate lending surveys from the ABA (2014, 2015, 2016), a survey by Peirce et al. 
(2014), and a study of the Congressional Research Service (Hoskins & Labonte, 
2015), I reason the following seven Dodd-Frank rules, each of which I briefly 
describe, may have the largest impact on community banks. 
 
Mortgage Related Rules 
(1) Loan originator compensation requirements under the Truth in Lending 
Act (Regulation Z), which was published on September 24th, 2010 and 
became effective on April 1st, 2011. 
The final rule implements additional requirements and restrictions imposed by 
the Dodd-Frank Act concerning loan originator compensation, qualifications 
of loan originators—loan originators are qualified when registered or licensed 
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to the extent required by State and Federal Law—and compliance procedures 
for depository institutions. In addition, this final rule establishes tests to 
determine when loan originators can be compensated.  
 
(2) Escrow requirements for higher-priced mortgage loans (Regulation Z), 
which was published on January 22nd, 2013 and became effective on June 1st, 
2013. 
The final rule requires creditors to establish and maintain an escrow account for 
five years (instead of one year) for first-lien higher-priced mortgage loans. The 
purpose of this final rule is to ensure that customers set aside funds to pay 
property taxes, premiums for homeowners’ insurance, and other mortgage 
related insurance required by the creditor. The final rule exempts small creditors 
that operate predominately in rural or underserved areas and meet certain 
criteria. 
 
(3) Final rule requiring appraisals for higher-priced mortgage loans 
(Regulation Z), which was published on February 13th, 2013 and became 
effective on January 18th, 2014. 
The final rule requires creditors to obtain appraisals meeting certain standards 
for mortgages that have an annual percentage rate that exceeds the average 
prime offer rate. The borrower must be provided a statement regarding the 
purpose of the appraisal and, within 3 business days before the mortgage is 
final, a free copy of the appraisal. 
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(4) Mortgage servicing rules under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
(Regulation X) and Truth Lending Act (Regulation Z), which was published on 
July 24th, 2013 and became effective on January 10th, 2014. 
The final rule implements provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act regarding 
mortgage loan servicing, addresses the mortgage servicer’s obligation to correct 
errors asserted by borrowers and provide information requested by these 
borrowers, provides borrowers with information about loss mitigation options, 
establishes policies and procedures for continuing contact between servicer 
personnel and borrowers, and protects borrowers connected with force-placed 
insurance. 
 
(5) The Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standard under the Truth in 
Lending Act (Regulation Z), which was published on January 30th, 2013 and 
became effective on January 10th, 2014. 
The Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Rule require lenders to make a 
good faith determination that the borrower has the ability to pay back a loan. 
The creditor must consider several underwriting factors such as the borrower’s 
current employment status, debt to income ratio, assets, and credit history in 
order to determine the borrower’s ability to repay. Creditors are also required to 
make qualified mortgage loans, which must meet further underwriting and 
pricing standards and comply with the ability to repay. A qualified mortgage 
loan requires that a borrower’s debt-to-income ratio does not exceed 43 percent. 
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Effects of mortgage-related rules on community banks  
 Representatives from the Independent Community Bankers of America 
indicated that community banks do not have appropriate technology and staff to 
support these mortgage rules that the Dodd-Frank Act imposes. According to the 22nd 
annual ABA real estate lending survey (2015), 63 percent of respondents reported that 
they did not provide escrow services due to the lack of escrow capabilities and 
adequate staff, 17 percent of respondents reported they did not provide escrow 
services due to the lack of third-party service providers. 
According to Marsh and Norman (2013), a customer of a community bank 
will have greater difficulty obtaining a loan because the mortgage related rules 
encourage financial product standardization. When products and services become 
more standardized, the traditional community bank model becomes less effective.  
Officers, who once relied on soft information and strong relationships with consumers 
to make lending decisions, now must operate differently; consequently, these 
relationship lenders may offer fewer loans. 
To comply with new regulatory rules, community banks also must update 
technology and hire additional compliance staff, both of which impose a relatively 
large regulatory burden on community banks. According to Pierce et al. (2014), banks 
have discontinued or plan to discontinue products such as residential mortgages, 
mortgage servicing, and home equity lines of credit as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act.  
Figure 5 presents average hours banks spent in 2013 on regulatory rules. 
Every additional hour that an employee spends dealing with compliance is an hour 
that she cannot serve the bank’s local community. 
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Source: Average results of 10 ABA member banks for the year of 2013 (as 
cited in An Avalanche of Regulation, American Bankers Association, 2014) 
 
Non-mortgage Related Rules 
(6) Final rule implementing regulatory capital rules (Regulations H, Q and Y), 
which was published on October 11th, 2013 and became effective on January 
1st, 2014.  
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System reason that the new capital rules will improve the 
banking system’s risk profile and overall resilience. The final rule implements 
higher minimum capital requirements, including a new common equity tier 1 
capital requirement. This final rule also establishes new criteria to define 
common equity tier 1 capital. And, the new rule imposes restrictions on 
regulatory capital instruments; for instance, under certain conditions, trust 
preferred securities and cumulative perpetual stock are categorized as tier 1 
capital. The final rule establishes a new capital conservation buffer, which 
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limits a bank’s ability to pay dividends and bonuses. As I report in Table 4, the 
new common equity tier 1 capital requirement is 4.5 percent, compared to no 
standard requirement before the Dodd-Frank Act was passed; and tier 1 capital 
is 6 percent, compared to 4 percent before the act was passed. In addition, the 
capital conservation buffer is 2.5 percent of risk-weighted assets, compared to 
no standard requirements before the Act was passed. The common equity tier 
1 capital and the capital conservation buffer together restrict banks from 
distributing their profits.  
 
Table 4: Comparison of the current rule with the new rule 
 Current General Risk-
Based Capital Rule 
New Capital Rule 
Minimum regulatory capital ratios  
Common equity tier 1 capital Not applicable 4.5% 
Tier 1 capital 4% 6% 
Total capital  8% 8% 
Leverage ratio 4% (or 3%) 4% 
Capital buffers 
Capital conservation buffer Not applicable Capital conservation buffer 
equivalent to 2.5% of risk-
weighted assets; composed 
of common equity tier 1 
capital 
Source: FDIC – New capital rule, community bank guide 2013 
 (7) Debit card interchange fees and routing, which was published on July 
20th, 2011 and became effective on October 1st, 2011. 
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The final rule states that the amount of any interchange transaction fee that 
issuers charge related to a debit card transaction must be reasonable and 
proportional to the cost issuers incur on that transaction. A debit card issuer 
may not charge or receive a transaction fee that exceeds the sum of a 21-cent 
base component and 5 basis points of the transaction’s value. This transaction 
fee standard does not apply to banks with less than $10 billion in total assets; 
however, because community banks must compete with larger issuers, 
community banks must accept a lower interchange fee or pass this fee to 
customers in other forms of fees, resulting in a decline of debit card revenue. 
In addition, the final rule prohibits issuers and payment card networks from 
restricting the number of networks through which a debit card transaction can 
be processed. This component of the final rule does not exempt community 
banks.   
Effect of non-mortgage related rules on community banks 
Community banks were not required to comply with the new minimum capital 
requirements until January 1st, 2015, while the capital conservation buffer and the 
criteria to consider common equity tier 1 capital phase in over time.  Thus, 
community banks have had some time to adapt to the new capital requirements rule. 
In any case, community banks must revise call report schedules and train their staff to 
comply with the new rule. In the survey of the Mercatus Center, 59.5 percent of 
participants report they will increase their tier 1 capital ratio in the next five years, 
26.8 percent of participants report their tier 1 capital ratio will remain the same, and 
7.4 percent of participants report they will decrease their tier 1 capital ratio (Pierce et 
al., 2014). According to the Congressional Research Service, 146 banks with less than 
$500 million in total assets faced a capital shortfall of $620 million and lost tax 
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benefits totaling $3.4 million per year (Hoskins & Labonte, 2015).  Pasiouras et al. 
(2009) found that higher capital requirements negatively affected cost efficiency and 
profits of banks. 
Although community banks are exempted from the interchange fee standard 
rule, they are not exempted from network exclusivity prohibitions. Many parties raise 
concerns that prohibitions on network exclusivity will impose costs on small debit 
card issuers. Before the final rule goes into effect, some debit card issuers may 
provide debit cards that can process electronic debit transactions over two unaffiliated 
payment card networks, so these issuers may not incur costs to add additional 
unaffiliated payment card networks. However, for other debit card issuers, who do not 
have debit cards that can process electronic debit transactions over two unaffiliated 
payment card networks, they may incur costs to add additional unaffiliated payment 
card networks to comply with network exclusivity prohibitions. According to a survey 
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2013), 16 percent of 
respondents reported their need to add additional networks to meet the prohibition on 
network exclusivity.  Costs to add a second network range from $0 to $3.47 per card. 
In addition, the debit card interchange fees and routing rule affect exempt-issuers’ 
interchange fees and revenue. In 2009, interchange fees for all debit card issuers was 
43 cents on average. Average interchange fees per debit card transaction for exempt 
issuers was 44 cents for the first three quarters of 2011, and fell to 43 cents since the 
interchange fee standard went into effect. Thus, although the debit card interchange 
fees and routing rule statutorily exempted banks with total assets less than $10 billion, 
these banks were affected by this rule nonetheless.  
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4.2. Data 
 
The data I analyze are from the Consolidated Financial Statements for Holding 
Companies (FR-Y9C) reports, which I obtain from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago website. The original dataset for bank holding companies from 1991 to 2016 
Q4 includes 384,767 observations. I exclude any observations with missing values for 
total assets (BHCK2170) because if an observation is missing total assets, then other 
variables are also missing. I also exclude banks that have fewer than six quarterly 
reports. Finally, I eliminate any observations that include extreme values of the 
dependent variables. The final dataset includes more than 135,000 observations for 
the period from 1991 to 2016 Q4. This is an unbalanced panel because, over time, 
banks might enter or exist because, for example, they are acquired or they fail. 
Because the Consolidated Income Statement in FR-Y9C reports is on a calendar year-
to-date basis, I must annually adjust (flow) variables for incomes and expenses in 
each quarter. These variables include net interest income, income from fiduciary 
activities, income (or loss) before applicable income taxes and discontinued 
operations, salaries, and employee benefits. For these variables, I multiply Q1 values 
time 4, Q2 values time 2, and Q3 values time 4/3. 
Following Cyree (2015), I divide the sample into 5 groups based on each 
institution’s asset size: Group-1 banks include the largest banks with total assets 
greater than $50 billion, Group-2 banks include larger banks with total assets from 
$10 to $50 billion, Group-3 banks include banks with total assets from $5 to $10 
billion, Group-4 banks include banks with total assets from $1 to $5 billion, and 
Group-5 banks include banks with total assets less than $1 billion.  
To begin, I report summary statistics and discuss the results presented in Cyree 
(2015), who estimates the regulatory burden on loan-per-employee and other such 
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dependent variables of seven pieces of noteworthy financial regulation; namely, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Improvement Act (FDICIA), the Interstate Branching and 
Banking Efficiency Act (IBBEA), the IBBEA Interstate Banking and Branching 
Provision went into effect (IBBEA2), the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), the 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 
2001 (PATRIOT), the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) (in its entirety), and the Ability-to-
Repay and Qualified Mortgage (ATR). Then, to add to this literature, I estimate the 
effects of seven final rules associated with the Dodd-Frank Act.  
4.3.  Regression Model and Variables 
 
Cyree (2015) models the effect of regulation on banks’ costs and output. His 
autoregressive model is specified in Equation (2).  
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Where, 
 	
Y
i ,t  
is loan per employee for bank holding company i at time period t, 
and Q1, Q2, Q3 are dummy variables for quarters 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Quarter 4 
is omitted to avoid perfect muticollinearity. Additionally, LNASSET is the log of 
total assets, a control for the differences in bank sizes (within groups); CAPRATIO is 
the equity-to-asset ratio; NETINTINC is net interest income scaled by assets; 
FIDUINC is noninterest earnings, or income from fiduciary activities scaled by 
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assets; EXTRAORD is extra-ordinary income scaled by assets; NONACCRU is loans 
not accruing interest scaled by assets; AGLOANS is loans to finance agricultural 
production and other loans to farmers scaled by assets; USCNILOAN is US 
commercial and industrial loans scaled by assets; FORCNILOAN is foreign 
commercial and industrial loans scaled by assets; BIGCDS is time deposits of 
$100,000 or more scaled by assets; ALLL is the allowance for loan and lease losses 
scaled by assets; PLLL is the provision for loan and lease losses scaled by assets; 
GDPGROWTH is the annualized quarterly growth rate of US gross domestic product; 
DEMDEPS is noninterest-bearing balances, including demand, time, and saving 
deposits; TECHNFA is expenses of premises and fixed assets scaled by assets; NOW 
is interest-bearing deposits, including NOW, ATS, and other transaction accounts, 
scaled by assets; MMDA is money market deposit accounts and other saving accounts 
scaled by assets; SMALLCD is time deposits of less than $100,000 scaled by assets.  
Table 5: Major regulatory acts and time period definitions 
Act Name Time period 
Federal Deposit Insurance Improvement Act (FDICIA) 1991 Q4 through 1992 Q2 
Interstate Branching and Banking Efficiency Act (IBBEA) 1995 Q2 through 1995 Q4 
IBBEA branching provisions into effect (IBBEA2) 1997 Q1 through 1997 Q3 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) 2000 Q1 through 2000 Q3 
PATRIOT Act (PATRIOT) 2001 Q4 through 2002 Q2 
Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) 2010 Q3 through 2011 Q1 
Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage (ATR) 2013 Q1 through 2013 Q4 
Source: Cyree, 2015 
Table 5 reports the seven major regulatory events Cyree (2015) uses to measure 
the effects of regulation on banks. For each regulatory event, he assigns a value of one 
to three observations of the corresponding dummy variable: the quarter that the 
regulatory event is passed, and two quarters after the regulatory event is passed. 
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According to Cyree (2015), the independent variable for the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) takes a value of 1 for the time 
period 1991 Q4 through 1992 Q2 and 0 otherwise; the variable for the Interstate 
Branching and Bank Efficiency Act (IBBEA) takes a value of 1 for the time period 
1995 Q2 through 1995 Q4 and 0 otherwise; the variable for the IBBEA2, which 
indicates when the branching provision goes into effect, takes a value of 1 for the time 
period 1997 Q1 through 1997 Q3 and 0 otherwise; the variable for the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act (GLBA) takes a value of 1 for the time period 2000 Q1 through 2000 Q3 
and 0 otherwise; the variable for the Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (PATRIOT) takes a value of 1 for the time 
period 2001 Q4 through 2002 Q2 and 0 otherwise; the variable for the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) takes a value of 1 for the 
time period 2010 Q3 through 2011 Q1 and 0 otherwise; and the variable for the 
Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgages (ATR) takes a value of 1 for the time 
period 2013 Q1 through 2013 Q4 and 0 otherwise.  
Effects of mortgage and non-mortgage related rules on community banks 
Similar to Cyree’s model in Equation (2), my model of effects of final rules on 
banks’ costs and output is specified in Equation (3), where I replace broad financial 
legislation by specific final rules. I omit the variable (EXTRAORD), which captures 
merger activity, branch sales, or other (rare) non-reoccurring events1. 
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1 Cyree uses this variable as a control variable to account for large and unusual events. I omit this 
variable due to the lack of data. 
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Table 6: Final rules and time period definition 
Final Rule Implementation 
Loan originator compensation requirements (ORIGI) 
Debit card interchange fees and routing (DEBIT) 
2011 Q2 through 2011 Q4 
2011 Q4 through 2012 Q2 
Escrow requirements for higher-priced mortgage loans (ESCR) 2013 Q2 through 2013 Q4 
Final rule requiring appraisals for higher-priced mortgage 
(RULE) 
2014 Q1 through 2014 Q3 
Mortgage servicing rules (RULE) 2014 Q1 through 2014 Q3 
The Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standard (RULE) 2014 Q1 through 2014 Q3 
Final rule implementing regulatory capital rules (RULE) 2014 Q1 through 2014 Q3 
 
Table 6 reports seven final rules—mortgage and non-mortgage related 
associated with the Dodd-Frank Act—that may have large impact on community 
banks. For each rule, I assign a value of one to three observations of the 
corresponding dummy variable: the quarter that the rule became effective, and two 
quarters immediately afterwards.  
The independent variable for loan originator compensation requirements 
(ORIGI) takes a value of 1 for the time period from 2011 Q2 through 2011 Q4 and 0 
otherwise; the variable for the Escrow requirements for higher-priced mortgage loans 
(ESCR) takes a value of 1 for the time period from 2013 Q2 through 2013 Q4 and 0 
otherwise; the variable for the group of mortgaged-related rules (RULE) takes a value 
of 1 for the time period from 2014 Q1 through 2014 Q3 and 0 otherwise; the variable 
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for debit card interchange fees and routing (DEBIT) takes a value of 1 for the time 
period from 2011 Q4 through 2012 Q2 and 0 otherwise.  
 
Estimation techniques 
The general model for Equation (2) and Equation (3) is:
 
    
(4)                  
 For i = 1, 2, …, N; and t = 1, 2, …, T
 
Where λj is the autoregressive parameter, X is the vector of explanatory 
variables, rulek is a dummy variable for final rule k, αi is the unobservable bank 
effect, and εi,t is the an error term.  
To explain my panel-regression estimation method, I use, as my example, banks 
with assets less than $1 billion and loans per employee as the dependent variable. 
When dealing with panel data, a question of whether to pool or not to pool data 
arises naturally. Put differently, a researcher must test for the presence of individual 
effects (in this case, unobservable banks effects) when dealing with panel data. The 
hypothesis is written as H0: αi = 0, i = 1, 2, …, N. An F-test is applied to test for the 
poolability across cross sections—in this case cross sections are banks—in a panel 
data model. Consider the F statistic: 
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Where SSER is the residual sum of squares under the null hypothesis; this 
measure is obtained from OLS estimation; and SSEU is the residual sum of squares 
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under the alternative hypothesis; this measure is obtained from fixed effects 
estimation (Kunst, 2009).  
For banks with total assets less than $1 billion, the F-test statistic for poolability 
across banks is F-test = 153.75, which corresponds to a p-value < 0.05; thus, in this 
case, I reject the null hypothesis at the 5 percent level of significance and I determine 
that the fixed effect model is favorable.  
Next, I use the Hausman test for a random effects model. The Hausman test 
statistic is constructed based on q = βRE - βFE. Where βRE is the coefficient obtained 
from random effects estimation; and βFE is coefficient obtained from fixed effects 
estimation. Hausman (1978) suggested comparing the βRE and βFE under the null 
hypothesis of no correlation; there should be no difference between βRE and βFE if the 
random effects model is favorable. Consider the Hausman test statistic: m = 
q′[var(q)]-1q, where var(q) = var(βFE) – var(βRE) (Baltagi, 2013, p. 76-77). The 
Hausman-test statistic for banks with total assets less than $1 billion is 3110.06, 
which corresponds to a p-value < 0.05; thus, in this case, I reject the null hypothesis at 
the 5 percent level of significance and I determine that the fixed effects model is 
favorable. 
Thus far, the F and Hausman tests imply that the fixed effects model is most 
favorable. Finally, I use the Durbin-Watson test to test for first-order correlation in a 
fixed effects model as Bhargava, Franzini and Narendranathan (1982) instruct; 
specifically, I test the null hypothesis H0: λ= 0 against the alternative hypothesis 
H1:λ < 1. For large N, there is no need to compute the upper bound and lower 
bound. Instead, I compare whether the Durbin-Watson statistic test is less than 2 
(Baltagi, 2013, p. 109-110). For banks with less than $1 billion in assets, the DW-test 
test statistic is 0.38, which is very far from 2; thus, I reject the null hypothesis and 
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determine that first-order serial correlation is present in the fixed effects model. Thus, 
in this case, I estimate a fixed effects model with one autoregressive lag, which I 
specified in Equation 5 below. 
       (5)
 
I use the GMM two step methodology to estimate equation (5), as Arellano and 
Bond (1991) suggest. 
I perform these diagnostic tests for the other four groups of banks and for the 
other three dependent variables. The Hausman test and F-test for other bank groups 
imply that the fixed effects model is most favorable, and the Durbin-Watson test for 
first-order correlation in a fixed effect model implies that first-order serial correlation 
is present in all these fixed effects models except the one in which the change in 
number of employees is the dependent variable. In this case, the Durbin-Watson test 
for first-order correlation implies that there is no autocorrelation. 
Chapter 5: EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
In Table 7, I report descriptive statistics for my dataset for the period from 1991 
Q1 to 2014 Q1; I do so to demonstrate that my dataset matches that of Cyree (2015), 
who reports a nearly identical table. Pretax return on assets, assets per employee, and 
average pay tend to fall as the asset sizes of banks fall. On average, a bank with total 
assets less than $1 billion has 150 employees and an employee makes $1.9 million of 
loans; a bank with total assets ranging from $1 billion to $5 billion has 662 employees 
and an employee makes $2.67 million of loans; the largest community banks have 
2,332 employees on average, and an employee makes $2.6 million of loans. The 
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largest banks have 49,926 employees on average; however, an employee only makes 
$2.89 million of loans, which indicates that largest banks earn most revenue from 
non-traditional banking activities.   
As I indicated above, Cyree (2015) measures costs and productivity for the 
banking industry around seven major regulatory events from 1991 to 2014 Q1. He 
uses pooled OLS regression to estimate the autoregressive model corresponding to 
Equation (2). In doing so, he concludes there are varied effects of these seven 
regulatory changes on banks. Pretax return on assets increases for all five groups of 
banks after the passage of the PATRIOT Act, but pretax return on assets decreases for 
Group-4 and Group-5 banks during the rulemaking period of the Dodd-Frank Act 
(Ability to Repay and Qualified Mortgage period—ATR) from 2013 Q1 through 2013 
Q4. Loans per employee decrease for all five groups of banks after the passage of 
FDICIA and PATRIOT Acts; but, loans per employee increase for all five groups of 
banks during the rulemaking period of the Dodd-Frank Act and increase for Group-2, 
Group-4, and Group-5 banks after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act.  Percentage 
change in number of employees decreases for all five groups of banks after the 
passage of the Gramm Leach Bliley Act, and decreases for the two smallest 
community-bank groups during the rulemaking period of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Salaries to assets for four out of five groups of banks increase during the rulemaking 
period of the Dodd-Frank Act (because, according to Cyree (2015), banks replaced 
current employees with higher paid and more productive employees). For the sake of 
comparison, I return to these results below, where I discuss my findings.  
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Table 7: Means of selected variables 
Variable Assets > $50 Billion 
(N= 2,729) 
Assets $10 - $50 Billion 
(N=5,231) 
Assets $5 - $10 Billion 
(N=4,654) 
Assets  $1 - $5 Billion 
(N=25,060) 
Assets < $1 Billion 
(N= 101,043) 
SAL2ASST 0.0161 0.0171 0.0174 0.0168 0.0171 
PREROA 0.0145 0.0155 0.0155 0.0124 0.0131 
ASSTPEREMP 7.0603 4.9861 4.2717 4.1678 2.9670 
LOANPEREMPL 2.8916 3.2539 2.6033 2.6728 1.9017 
TECHNFA 2.5295 2.9565 2.9024 2.8208 2.8532 
NUMEMP 49,926.25 7,072.22 2,332.54 662.24 150.88 
TOTASSET 275,662,095 21,915,313.51 7,031,041.84 2,046,377.09 384,749.69 
AVGPAY 93.15 60.35 59.10 58.64 46.45 
Assets per employee, loans per employee and technical expenses are in millions of dollars; total assets and average pay are in thousand of 
dollars.
  
 
41
 
 
 
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the averages of total assets of banks across the five 
groups from 1991 to 2016. Over this period, total assets for the smallest community 
banks (Group-3 banks) and the largest community banks (Group-5 banks) trended 
upward on average. The average of total assets of Group-5 banks was $255.697 
million in 1991 and three-times larger in 2016; over the same period, the average of 
total assets of Group-3 banks was $6,805 million in 1991 and $7,467 million in 2016. 
Meanwhile, the average of total assets of Group-1 banks increased more than 4 times, 
from $94,435 million in 1991 to $394,889 million in 2016.  
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Figure 8 illustrates pretax returns on assets across the five groups of banks from 
1991 to 2016. Overall, in terms of profitability, large banks have outperformed 
community banks. From 1991 to 2007, average pretax return on assets was 1.45 
percent for Group-5 banks, 1.57 percent for Group-4 banks, and 1.83 percent for 
Group-3 banks. From 2008 to 2010, average pretax return on assets for all bank 
groups dropped dramatically and turned negative in 2009.  This return improved after 
the financial crisis, when average annual growth rates were 0.88 percent for Group-5 
banks, 1.07 percent for Group-4 banks, and 1.33 percent for Group-3 banks. Among 
these community-bank groups, Group-3 banks—those with total assets between $5 
billion to $10 billion—had the highest pretax return on assets. Banks in this group 
also performed best during the crisis.   
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Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the average number of employees of banks across the 
five groups from 1991 to 2016. The average of number of employees tended to 
decrease for Group-2, Group-3, and Group-4 banks. When mortgage and non-
mortgage related rules went into effect from 2011 to 2014, the average number of 
employees tended to increase for Group-3 banks. The average number of employees 
for Group-5 banks increased since mid 2013, during and after the mortgage related 
rules went into effect. The average number of employees tended to increase for 
Group-1 banks, and this group of banks had an increase in average number of 
employees in 2010 and 2011, around the time the Dodd-Frank Act was passed.  
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Figure 11 illustrates average dollar value of loans per employee across five 
groups of banks from 1991 to 2016. Loans per employee tended to increase for all 
five groups of banks during the period 1991 to 2016. Loans per employee for Group-4 
and Group-5 banks decreased after the financial crisis and troughed in late 2010, 
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around the time the Dodd-Frank Act was passed. Loans per employee for Group-3 
banks tended to increase before the crisis, remained steady during crisis and when the 
Dodd-Frank Act was passed.  
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Figure 12 illustrates salaries as a percentage of assets across the five groups of 
banks. Salaries to assets for the three groups of community banks increased from 
2011 to 2013. After 2013, salaries to assets decreased for two groups of banks: those 
with total assets ranging from $1 billion to $5 billion and those with total assets 
ranging from $5 billion to $10 billion. Salaries to assets in the group of the smallest 
banks increased until 2015, and decreased thereafter. 
5.2. Empirical results 
 
Effects of mortgage and non-mortgage related rules 
Loans per employee 
Table 8 reports the effects of mortgage and non-mortgage related rules on loans 
per employee across five groups of banks. I am primarily interested in the coefficients 
on indicator variables ORIGI, DEBIT, RULE, and ESCR. 
The coefficients on indicator variables are statistically significant for Group-4 
and Group-5 banks.  Specifically, ESCR and RULE are positively related to loans per 
employee for Group-5 banks—those with less than $1 billion in assets. Similarly, 
ESCR and RULE are positively related to loans per employee for Group-4 banks—
those with $1 billion to $5 billion in assets. The coefficients on indicator variables are 
statistically insignificant for other groups of banks. 
In summary, I conclude that mortgage and non-mortgage related rules only 
affect loans per employee at the smallest community banks.   
As the mortgage and non-mortgage related rules impose a greater regulatory 
burden on community banks, mortgage lending in community banks is affected. I 
expected loans per employee in community banks to decrease during the 
implementation of these seven final rules; and these rules should not have large 
effects on large banks. My results are consistent with my expectation about the effects 
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of these rules on large banks; however, the results are different from my expectation 
about the effects of these rules on community banks. Loans per employee increased 
during the passage of RULE from 2014 Q1 to 2014 Q3; this contradicted my 
expectation and the findings of a survey conducted by the Independent Community 
Bankers of America in 2014 in which 73 percent of community bank members 
reported a decline in mortgage lending. However, My results are consistent with those 
of Cyree (2015) for Group-4 and Group-5 banks; in these cases, Cyree finds that loans 
per employee increased during the period from 2013 Q2 to 2013 Q4.  
 
Pretax return on assets 
Table 9 reports the effects of mortgage and non-mortgage related rules on 
pretax returns on assets across five groups of banks.  
The coefficients on three of four indicator variables are all statistically 
significant for Group-5 banks. Specifically, ESCR, and RULE are negatively related 
to pretax returns on assets for Group-5 banks—those with less than $1 billion in 
assets; meanwhile, DEBIT is positively related to pretax return on assets for this 
community-bank group. Somewhat similarly, RULE is negatively related to pretax 
return on asset for Group-4 banks—those with $1 billion to $5 billion in assets. 
Meanwhile, the coefficients on indicator variables are statistically insignificant for 
Group-1, Group-2 and Group-3 banks—those with greater than $5 billion in assets. 
In general, I conclude that the mortgage and non-mortgage related rules have a 
negative impact on pretax return on assets at the smallest community-banks.  
As the mortgage and non-mortgage related rules impose regulatory burden on 
community banks, these banks’ profitability is affected. I expected profits at 
community banks to fall during the implementation of these final rules; and profits at 
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large banks should not be affected during the implementation of these rules.  My 
results are consistent with my expectations and findings of other studies, an increase 
in regulation will reduce banking profitability; those studies include Pasiousras et al. 
(2009), Feldman et al. (2013), Cyree (2015), and Brewer and Russel (2016). 
Moreover, the absolute values of coefficients on indicators are greatest for the 
smallest community-bank group, which suggest that this group is affected the most 
severely. This is consistent with Dolar and Shughart (2007) and Brewer and Russell 
(2016), who find disproportionally large regulatory burdens for small banks. Dolar 
and Shughart (2007) find compliance costs fall more heavily on small institutions 
than large institutions. Brewer and Russell (2016) find that an increase in regulation 
will result in a decrease in profitability of financial institutions, especially for banks 
with assets of less than $250 million. 
 
Percentage change in number of employees 
Table 10 reports the effects of mortgage and non-mortgage related rules on the  
percentage change in the number of employees across five groups of banks.  
The coefficients on indicator variables are statistically significant for Group-4 
and Group-5 banks. Specifically, ESCR and RULE are negatively related to 
percentage change in number of employees for Group-5 banks—those with less than 
$1 billion in assets. Similarly, ESCR and RULE are negatively related to percentage 
change in number of employees for Group-4 banks—those with $1 billion to $5 
billion in assets. Somewhat similarly, RULE is negatively related to percentage 
change in number of employees for Group-2 banks—those with $10 billion to $50 
billion in assets. 
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Meanwhile, RULE is negatively related to percentage change in number of 
employees for Group-1 banks—those with greater than $50 billion in assets; on the 
other hand, ORIGI is positively related to percentage change in number of employees 
for this group of banks. 
In summary, I conclude that mortgage and non-mortgage related rules 
negatively affect percentage change in number of employees at banks.  
As the mortgage and non-mortgage related rules impose regulatory burden on 
community banks, I expect these banks to hire additional employee to deal with 
compliance; thus, number of employees increases. My results are inconsistent with 
my expectation; nevertheless, my results are similar to Cyree (2015) findings. Cyree’s 
(2015) finds the decline in percentage change of number of employees for Group-4 
and Group-5 banks during the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Ability-to-
Repay and Qualified mortgage rule.  
 
Salaries to assets   
Table 11 reports the effects of mortgage and non-mortgage related rules on 
salaries to assets across five groups of banks.  
ORIGI is negatively related to salaries to assets for Group-5 banks—those with 
less than $1 billion in assets; meanwhile, ESCR is positively related to salaries to 
assets for this group. Somewhat similarly, RULE is negatively related to salaries to 
assets for Group-3 and Group-4 banks—those with $1 billion to $10 billion in assets. 
Meanwhile, the coefficients on indicator variables are statistically insignificant for 
Group-1 and Group-2 banks—those with greater than $10 billion in assets. 
In summary, I conclude that the mortgage and non-mortgage related rules only 
affect salaries to assets at community banks, and these effects vary.   
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 Salaries to assets can be a proxy for noninterest expenses. As mortgage and 
non-mortgage related rules impose regulatory burden on community banks, I expected 
salaries to assets at community banks increase during the implementation of these 
rules. Moreover, literature shows an increase in noninterest expenses after the passage 
of financial legislation; examples include Dolar and Shughart (2007), Pierce et al. 
(2014), and Hogan and Burns (2016). I find inconsistent results with my expectation 
and with general findings in the literature. 
Besides, I also run the regression model with 4 lags of the dependent variable, 
which I report in Appendices A, B, C and D as Cyree (2015) did to make the 
comparison. Including 4 lags of the dependent variable does not improve the model 
(R-square for the autoregressive models does not improve when including 4 lags of 
the dependent variables, some of them are lower than the fixed effects models). 
Moreover, some lags of the dependent variable are statistically insignificant, which 
suggests it is unnecessary to include them in the model. 
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Table 8: Loan per employee is dependent variable, fixed effects model with first-order autocorrelation 
 
Variables 
Assets > $50 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $10 - $50 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $5 - $10 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $1 - $5 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets < $1 billion 
Coefficient 
Q1 -0.01875 -0.05437 -0.04768 -0.03102 -0.01123(**) 
Q2 0.001 -0.03413 -0.03142 -0.02002 -0.00885(**) 
Q3 0.00036 -0.01139 -0.00367 0.00548 0.00935(*) 
LOANPEREMP_1 0.90511 0.86572 0.83987 0.81123(*) 0.74252(*) 
LNASSETS 0.2106 0.18787 0.23641 0.3203(*) 0.33726(*) 
CAPRATIO -0.48379 -0.3816 -0.8323 -0.44587 -0.83228 
NETINTINC -0.19049 -1.32544 -1.57895 -2.55669 -1.51617 
FIDUINC 1.41092 -5.73204 4.25666 -12.2595 -2.96946 
NONACCRU -4.96987 -0.63525 1.74628 -0.45719 0.12993 
AGLOANS -19.76605 -2.62502 1.18688 1.98055 2.21765(*) 
USCNILOAN 0.37073 0.58076 1.12989 1.64747(*) 1.20543(*) 
FORCNILOAN -1.47564 2.11957 3.72271 0.34877 1.78826(*) 
BIGCDS -0.05745 -0.20411 -0.1551 -0.30233 -0.11799 
ALLL 1.08158 -1.32713 -5.35192 1.51494 -0.75777 
PLLL -1.51419 -0.29204 -1.17386 -2.15776(**) -1.02821 
GDPGROWTH -0.00062 -0.00109 -0.00109 -0.00246(**) -0.00073 
DEMDEPS -0.32102 -0.08317 -0.14634 -0.68078 -0.54422(*) 
TECHNFA -0.00115 -0.01019 -0.01042 -0.00442 -0.00103 
NOW 1.03964 -0.22457 0.10287 -0.42814 -0.34544(*) 
MMDA -0.16493 -0.07659 -0.03641 -0.5744(**) -0.41055(*) 
SMALLCD 0.48636 -0.09638 -0.33412 -0.42727 -0.2946(*) 
ORIGI 0.00036 0.00702 -0.00331 -0.00585 0.00014 
ESCR 0.02258 0.03388 0.03923 0.04567(*) 0.03448(*) 
RULE 0.05023 0.07212 0.03812 0.07244(*) 0.06262(*) 
DEBIT 0.09274 0.01103 0.00179 0.00288 -0.00341 
Constant -3.5498 -2.643242 -3.14783 -3.76745(*) -3.5230(*) 
No. Obs 1,842 3,452 2,847 18,056 74,296 
No. Banks 73 178 199 910 3268 
Note: Fixed effect model estimator results  (*) significance at the 99% level, (**) significance at the 95% level. 
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Table 9: Pretax return on assets is dependent variable, fixed effects model with first-order autocorrelation 
 
Variables 
Assets > $50 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $10 - $50 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $5 - $10 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $1 - $5 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets < $1 billion 
Coefficient 
Q1 -0.00089 -0.00159 -0.00375 -0.00401(*) -0.00193(*) 
Q2 -0.00069 -0.0014 -0.00249 -0.00321(*) -0.00143(*) 
Q3 -0.00002 -0.00056 -0.00125 -0.00143(**) -0.00054(*) 
PREROA_1 0.41985 0.47792(**) 0.42792 0.35897(*) 0.31934(*) 
LNASSETS -0.00161 -0.00012 -0.00272 -0.00149 0.00073 
CAPRATIO 0.0143 0.02049 0.03392 0.10111 0.08330(*) 
NETINTINC 0.44581 0.45365 0.67162 0.60707(**) 0.6223(*) 
FIDUINC 0.40287 0.18847 0.27703 0.45969 0.17267 
NONACCRU -0.37821 -0.10702 -0.10423 -0.02277 -0.00694 
AGLOANS 0.74893 -0.16223 -0.06293 -0.00553 -0.00232 
USCNILOAN -0.00987 -0.00722 -0.00365 -0.01106 -0.00056 
FORCNILOAN 0.00238 -0.1509 0.03854 0.00325 0.00005 
BIGCDS -0.0109 -0.00683 0.00834 -0.00413 -0.00486 
ALLL 0.10042 -0.11958 0.05183 -0.33384 -0.49489(*) 
PLLL -0.51642 -0.51979 -0.58482 -0.89373(*) -0.8349(*) 
GDPGROWTH 0.00023 0.00019 0.00016 0.00013(**) 0.00005(*) 
DEMDEPS 0.00295 0.00618 -0.00617 0.00428 0.00098 
TECHNFA -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.00078 -0.00078 -0.00028(*) 
NOW -0.01833 -0.00029 -0.0025 -0.00304 0.00342 
MMDA 0.00265 -0.00406 -0.00293 -0.00174 0.0012 
SMALLCD -0.03953 -0.00987 -0.02716 -0.00971 -0.00404 
ORIGI -0.00156 0.00053 -0.00101 -0.00049 -0.00022 
ESCR -0.0042 -0.00133 0.00011 -0.00232 -0.00061(**) 
RULE -0.00254 -0.00146 0.00125 -0.00259(**) -0.00146(*) 
DEBIT -0.00108 -0.00194 0.00053 0.0002 0.00044(**) 
Constant 0.029 0.00086 0.03488 0.01199 -0.02271 
No. Obs 1,842 3,452 2,847 18,056 74,296 
No. Banks 73 178 199 910 3268 
Note: Fixed effect model estimator results  (*) significance at the 99% level, (**) significance at the 95% level.
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Table 10: Change in number of employee is dependent variable, fixed effects model  
 
Variables 
Assets > $50 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $10 - $50 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $5 - $10 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $1 - $5 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets < $1 billion 
Coefficient 
Q1 -1.91683(*) -1.18129 -2.24(*) -1.43522(*) -1.11428(*) 
Q2 -1.45834(*) -0.37656 -0.76413(**) -0.22613 0.16935(**) 
Q3 -1.29376(*) -0.96618(*) -1.10228(*) -1.16194(*) -0.98451(*) 
LNASSETS -0.465 -0.39394 0.93137 -0.4196(**) -0.64513(*) 
CAPRATIO -1.55394 -3.19333 -4.94566 -4.859 -0.1204 
NETINTINC -34.81971 -28.93467 -11.71574 -6.27095 -27.43414(*) 
FIDUINC -63.27417 -71.29997 70.68511(*) -275.4609(*) -24.64811 
NONACCRU -44.42456 -47.31563(*) -40.48074(**) -21.78879(*) -29.75913(*) 
AGLOANS 22.79613 9.2893 -20.66502 9.2504 -0.07676(*) 
USCNILOAN -7.54375 -6.77189(**) -6.23579 1.12308 3.8272 
FORCNILOAN -3.54799 32.03111(*) 4.40645 -3.38 -1.04946 
BIGCDS -7.94021 3.45354 0.48138 0.70439 0.92516 
ALLL -17.27414 -7.70711 -10.87385 -38.9098(**) -65.51693(*) 
PLLL -34.85454 7.86686 -30.38213 -16.49741 12.63119 
GDPGROWTH 0.01597 0.07901(**) 0.06036(**) 0.06117(*) 0.03024(*) 
DEMDEPS -1.44111 2.92813 -1.14986 3.4886(*) 3.01791(*) 
TECHNFA -0.50942(*) -0.25212 -0.46765(*) -0.37027(*) -0.32099 
NOW 17.61105(**) 3.96008 3.83511 1.06323 -0.92988 
MMDA -0.402 0.91386 -1.87629 -0.07235 -0.38343 
SMALLCD 6.80269 5.11324(*) 4.22271 1.04319 1.51212(*) 
ORIGI 0.75957(**) -0.0081 0.25661 0.03978 -0.07151 
ESCR -0.56204 -0.511 -0.50648 -0.53377(*) -0.44893(*) 
RULE -1.11208(*) -1.29796(**) -0.4377 -1.03004(*) -0.82567(*) 
DEBIT -0.68595 0.23888 0.18818 0.11586 0.15484 
Constant 14.70935(**) 9.29309 -10.2719 9.18953(*) 11.31069(*) 
No. Obs 2,079 3,985 3,435 20,685 84,341 
No. Banks 81 197 230 993 3452 
Note: Fixed effect model estimator results  (*) significance at the 99% level, (**) significance at the 95% level.
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Table 11: Salaries to assets is dependent variable, fixed effects model with first-order autocorrelation 
 
Variables 
Assets > $50 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $10 - $50 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $5 - $10 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $1 - $5 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets < $1 billion 
Coefficient 
Q1 0.00128 0.00142 0.00132(*) 0.00108(*) 0.00052(*) 
Q2 0.00047 0.0005 0.0005(**) 0.00035(*) 0.0001 
Q3 0.00018 0.00035 0.00035(*) 0.0002(*) -0.00003 
SAL2ASSET_1 0.68347 0.71664 0.55969(*) 0.55678(*) 0.36856(*) 
LNASSETS -0.00054 0.00015 -0.00067 -0.00015 -0.00062(*) 
CAPRATIO 0.00736 -0.0021 0.0008 0.0009 0.01807(*) 
NETINTINC 0.05649 0.13936 0.11048(*) 0.18597(*) 0.17224(*) 
FIDUINC 0.26582 0.32095 0.26252(*) 0.58991(**) 0.50978(*) 
NONACCRU 0.00501 0.01929 -0.0029 0.00381 0.00291 
AGLOANS -0.27881 -0.00818 0.0085 -0.00241 -0.00189 
USCNILOAN -0.00162 -0.00083 0.00339 0.00325 0.00324 
FORCNILOAN 0.0115 -0.01225 -0.0106 -0.00714 0.00318 
BIGCDS 0.00133 0.00143 -0.00052 0.00038 -0.00003 
ALLL -0.03098 -0.05121 -0.02118 0.00072 0.05037(**) 
PLLL 0.01776 0.00357 0.01627 -0.00104 -0.00216 
GDPGROWTH 0.000002 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001 0.0000002 
DEMDEPS 0.00233 0.0022 0.0018 0.00474 0.00217 
TECHNFA 0.00019 0.00017 0.00016 0.00015(*) 0.00004(**) 
NOW -0.00502 0.00212 0.00112 0.00303 0.00093 
MMDA 0.00264 0.00183 0.00452(*) 0.00395 0.00291(*) 
SMALLCD 0.00019 0.00023 -0.0037 -0.00004 -0.00183 
ORIGI -0.00001 -0.00012 -0.00003 -0.00017 -0.00022(*) 
ESCR -0.00002 0.0001 0.00011 0.00015 0.00037(*) 
RULE -0.00081 -0.00076 -0.00072(*) -0.00046(**) -0.0001 
DEBIT 0.00004 0.00002 0.0001 0.00006 -0.00004 
Constant 0.01103 -0.00487 0.01072 -0.00118 0.0081(**) 
No. Obs 1,842 3,452 2,847 18,056 74,296 
No. Banks 73 178 199 910 3268 
Note: Fixed effect model estimator results  (*) significance at the 99% level, (**) significance at the 95% level.
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Chapter 6: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Community banks play a crucial role in the US economy; these banks are often 
the only local source of banking services for many counties, and the main credit 
source for rural communities and small businesses. The literature on community 
banking shows evidence that community banks were not the main causes of the 
financial crisis in 2008, and the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act was not intended to 
apply to community banks. The Dodd-Frank Act exempts institutions with $10 billion 
or less in total assets; thus, much of the Act is not intended to apply to community 
banks. Although community banks are exempted from many of the Act’s rules, there 
remains much debate over the regulatory burden the Act imposes—indirectly or 
otherwise—on community banks. 
The purpose of this study was to learn the effects of the Dodd-Frank Act on 
community banks; more specifically, the effects of seven rules associated with the 
Dodd-Frank Act—mortgage and non-mortgage related rules—on community banks. 
To do that, I used quarterly bank holding company data from 1991 Q1 to 2016 Q4 to 
measure the performance of community banks (in terms of loans per employee, pretax 
return on assets, percentage change in number of employees, and salaries to assets) 
after the passage of seven final rules and compared these results with the performance 
of larger banks during the same period. I modeled each performance measure as a 
function of bank-specific observable variables, bank-specific unobserved (fixed-
effect) heterogeneity, and the Dodd-Frank Act rule dummy variables. I estimated my 
model across five groups of banks, which I divided based on asset size. I found that 
the effects of the Dodd-Frank Act rules on bank performance vary by bank size. My 
estimated results showed that these seven final rules affected community banks more 
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severely, but had little or no impact on larger banks, which is consistent with the 
existence of economies of scale in the banking industry as economic theory would 
suggest. However, these Dodd-Frank Act rules do not impose large economic burdens 
on any banks.  
In this study, I used three quarters for Dodd-Frank Act rule dummy variables to 
estimate the effects of these rules on bank performance; however, three quarters might 
not capture all the effects of the Dodd-Frank Act rules on bank performance. Future 
studies could estimate the effects of the Dodd-Frank Act rules on bank performance 
by using longer implementation periods and alternative econometric-model 
specifications.  
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Appendices  
Appendix A: Random effect model and autoregressive model for loan per employee 
Table 12: Loan per employee is dependent variable, random effect model 
 
Variables 
Assets > $50 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $10 - $50 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $5 - $10 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $1 - $5 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets < $1 billion 
Coefficient 
Intercept -2.8811(*) -18.6166(*) -23.9034(*) -13.6272(*) -7.6417(*) 
Q1 -0.3306(*) -0.5043*) -0.2823(*) -0.3566(*) -0.2552(*) 
Q2 -0.2014(*) -0.3303(*) -0.188(*) -0.2279(*) -0.1786(*) 
Q3 -0.0882(**) -0.1595(*) -0.0661(*) -0.1114(*) -0.0857(*) 
LNASSETS 0.2989(*) 1.286(*) 1.6297(*) 1.1466(*) 0.7868(*) 
CAPRATIO 6.1871(*) -0.4647 -3.5145(*) 1.7518(*) 0.909(*) 
NETINTINC -24.3023(*) -4.0689(**) 3.6167(**) -5.1609(*) 1.261(*) 
FIDUINC -20.0119(*) -25.9565(*) -9.0514(*) 7.7907(*) -12.0598(*) 
NONACCRU 1.7102 -2.5628 7.1443(*) -0.6467 2.2667(*) 
AGLOANS -20.0211(**) -0.7458 -3.2462 1.7637(*) 1.719(*) 
USCNILOAN 3.1655(*) 2.2759(*) 6.0156(*) 2.9108(*) 0.9526(*) 
FORCNILOAN -1.2605 0.8069 19.9526(*) 4.98(*) 0.7131(*) 
BIGCDS 3.4286(*) 0.17 -0.1479 0.4083(*) 1.4289(*) 
ALLL -14.9954(*) 22.1301(*) -6.3832 9.0728(*) 7.2629(*) 
PLLL 30.1985(*) -0.9907 -0.7848 3.5571 1.9775(*) 
GDPGROWTH -0.0085 -0.029(*) -0.0357(*) -0.0314(*) -0.01215(*) 
DEMDEPS 2.3729(*) 1.5234(*) 2.3962(*) 0.0075 -0.9727(*) 
TECHNFA -153.417(*) -138.71(*) -81.826(*) -107.894(*) -71.7865(*) 
NOW 1.0483 0.2526 1.459(*) 0.2232(**) -0.4286(*) 
MMDA 2.5097(*) 1.2716(*) 1.192(*) 0.0788 -0.059(*) 
SMALLCD -3.0546(*) -0.7644(*) 1.754(*) 0.1586(**) -0.3122(*) 
ORIGI -0.0758 -0.0671 -0.0954(**) -0.1085(*) -0.0109 
ESCR -0.0502 -0.1781(*) -0.0467 -0.1851(*) 0.0516(*) 
RULE 0.0913 0.0788 -0.0457 -0.0215 0.2068(*) 
DEBIT -0.0153 -0.0404 -0.0534 -0.1463(*) 0.0164 
Observations N = 2,994 N = 5,555 N = 4,885 N = 27,615 N= 96,297 
R-Square R2 = 0.37 R2 = 0.45 R2 = 0.39 R2 = 0.41 R2 = 0.54 
Note: Random effect model results  (*) significance at the 99% level, (**) significance at the 95% level. 
  
 
62
 
 
Table 13: Loan per employee is dependent variable, autoregressive model 
 
Variables 
Assets > $50 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $10 - $50 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $5 - $10 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $1 - $5 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets < $1 billion 
Coefficient 
Intercept -0.1402 -0.8471(*) -2.3383(*) -0.5628(*) -0.3259(*) 
Q1 -0.0543(**) -0.0764(*) -0.0793(*) -0.0642(*) -0.0485(*) 
Q2 -0.0276 -0.0557(*) -0.0443(*) -0.0325(*) -0.0252(*) 
Q3 0.0027 -0.0145 0.0026 -0.0054 0.0013 
LNASSETS 0.0148 0.055(*) 0.1556(*) 0.0533(*) 0.0366(*) 
CAPRATIO -0.2398 0.1986 0.1737 0.2408(*) -0.0776(*) 
NETINTINC -1.0059 0.1802 0.7811 -1.1838(*) -0.1244 
FIDUINC -2.6789(**) -2.1873(**) 0.1436 -0.3887 -3.3386 (*) 
NONACCRU -0.1594 -0.7811 0.8018 -0.1182(*) -0.8175(*) 
AGLOANS -1.2414 -1.3076(*) -0.0562 -0.0913 0.0918(*) 
USCNILOAN 0.2724(**) -0.0009 0.1334(**) 0.1164(*) 0.0899(*) 
FORCNILOAN 0.0444 0.0493 2.0467(*) 0.0531 -0.0801 
BIGCDS 0.5956(*) 0.2086(*) -0.0236 0.1155(*) 0.1271(*) 
ALLL -0.1567 1.1205 -2.5395(**) 0.822 0.4201(**) 
PLLL 2.322 -1.789 -1.1159 -2.1734(*) -2.0981(*) 
GDPGROWTH 0.0102(*) 0.0032 0.0009 -0.0041(*) 0.0038(*) 
DEMDEPS -0.0656 0.0455 -0.0752 -0.1718(*) -0.0952(*) 
TECHNFA -25.1717 -12.7032(*) -16.8838(*) -11.4566(*) -6.8869(*) 
NOW -0.5324(**) 0.0416 0.1614 -0.002 -0.1011(*) 
MMDA 0.2318(*) 0.0759(**) 0.0292 0.0331(**) -0.0184(*) 
SMALLCD -0.1571 -0.1595(*) -0.1424(*) -0.1557(*) -0.1203(*) 
ORIGI -0.0211 0.0603(**) 0.0144 -0.0241(**) -0.0202(*) 
ESCR 0.0409 0.0241 0.0065 0.0046 0.0177(*) 
RULE 0.0084 0.0673(*) -0.0362 0.0579(*) 0.0566(*) 
DEBIT 0.0868(**) -0.0444 -0.0375 -0.0229(*) -0.0122(**) 
Observations N = 2,944 N= 5,555 N = 4,885 N = 27,615 N = 96, 297 
R-Square R2 = 0.95 R2 = 0.98 R2 = 0.98 R2 = 0.96 R2 = 0.96 
Note: Autoregressive model with 4 lags of the dependent variable, coefficients for 4 lags of the dependent variable are not presented in the table   (*) significance at the 99% level, (**) 
significance at the 95% level.
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Appendix B: Random effect model and autoregressive model for pretax return on assets 
Table 14: Pretax return on assets is dependent variable, random effect model 
 
Variables 
Assets > $50 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $10 - $50 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $5 - $10 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $1 - $5 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets < $1 billion 
Coefficient 
Intercept 0.0233(*) -0.0276(*) -0.0119 -0.0183(*) -0.0142(*) 
Q1 -0.0002 -0.0015(*) -0.0031(*) -0.0054(*) -0.0053(*) 
Q2 -0.0001 -0.0011(*) -0.0018(*) -0.0035(*) -0.0039(*) 
Q3 0.0003 -0.0005(**) -0.0007(*) -0.0015(*) -0.0015(*) 
LNASSETS -0.0011(*) 0.0018(*) 0.0009 0.0011(*) 0.0009(*) 
CAPRATIO 0.0282(*) 0.0274(*) 0.0112(**) 0.027(*) 0.0318(*) 
NETINTINC 0.5299(*) 0.6114(*) 0.6308(**) 0.6301(*) 0.6043(*) 
FIDUINC 0.086 0.3368(*) 0.4359(*) 0.141(*) 0.282(*) 
NONACCRU -0.212(*) -0.1951(*) -0.1377(*) -0.1319(*) -0.104(*) 
AGLOANS -0.1452(**) -0.0342(*) -0.01 0.0119(*) 0.0038(*) 
USCNILOAN 0.0009 -0.0099(*) -0.0012 0.0024(**) 0.0002 
FORCNILOAN 0.0269 -0.0387(*) 0.0087 0.0304(*) 0.0069(*) 
BIGCDS 0.0076 -0.0001 -0.007(*) 0.0006 -0.0023(*) 
ALLL -0.1826(*) -0.1519(*) -0.152(*) -0.1885(*) -0.1618(*) 
PLLL -0.5673(*) -0.579(*) -0.789(*) -0.9905(*) -0.9649(*) 
GDPGROWTH 0.0006(*) 0.0005(*) 0.0003 0.0003(*) 0.0002(*) 
DEMDEPS -0.0107(*) -0.0102(*) -0.006(*) -0.0015 -0.0035(*) 
TECHNFA 0.1169 -0.0751 -0.4311(*) -1.1348(*) -1.1163(*) 
NOW -0.0199(*) -0.0299(*) -0.0031(*) -0.0087(*) -0.0013(*) 
MMDA -0.0073(*) -0.0115(*) -0.0069*) -0.0033(*) -0.0026(*) 
SMALLCD -0.027(*) -0.0056(*) -0.0141(*) -0.0006(*) -0.0005(**) 
ORIGI -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0007 0.00006 -0.0011(*) 
ESCR 0.0009 0.0002 -0.0007 -0.00006 -0.0008(*) 
RULE 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.00102(**) -0.0008(*) -0.0012(*) 
DEBIT -0.0008 -0.0003 0.0004 0.0004(**) -0.00004 
Observations N = 2,944 N = 5,555 N = 4,885 N = 27,615 N = 96,297 
R-Square R2 = 0.49 R2 = 0.5 R2 = 0.5 R2 = 0.63 R2 = 0.58 
Note: Random effect model estimator results  (*) significance at the 99% level, (**) significance at the 95% level. 
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Table 15: Pretax return on assets is dependent variable, autoregressive model 
 
Variables 
Assets > $50 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $10 - $50 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $5 - $10 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $1 - $5 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets < $1 billion 
Coefficient 
Intercept -0.0054 -0.0052(**) -0.0001 -0.0075(*) -0.0052(*) 
Q1 0.0027 0.001(*) -0.0004 -0.0028(*) -0.0031(*) 
Q2 0.0012 0.0001 -0.0008(*) -0.0023(*) -0.0021(*) 
Q3 0.0009(*) 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0009(*) -0.0008(*) 
LNASSETS 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0005(*) 0.0003(*) 
CAPRATIO 0.0287(*) 0.0206(*) 0.0176(*) 0.0042(*) 0.0125(*) 
NETINTINC 0.211(*) 0.1437(*) 0.2327(*) 0.3113(*) 0.283(*) 
FIDUINC 0.1062(*) 0.0855(*) 0.0941(*) 0.1246(*) 0.1154(*) 
NONACCRU -0.0872(*) -0.051(*) -0.0404(*) -0.0412(*) -0.0369(*) 
AGLOANS -0.0422 -0.0101(**) -0.0029 0.0074(*) 0.0011(*) 
USCNILOAN 0.0045(*) -0.0023(*) -0.0029(*) -0.0028(*) -0.0002 
FORCNILOAN -0.0066 0.0012 0.0031 0.0074(*) 0.0027(**) 
BIGCDS -0.0093 0.0022(**) 0.0002 0.0012(*) 0.0006(*) 
ALLL 0.0844(*) 0.0125 0.0299 0.0245(*) 0.0369(*) 
PLLL -0.3694(*) -0.285(*) -0.4975(*) -0.7111(*) -0.6635(*) 
GDPGROWTH 0.0003(*) 0.0003(*) 0.0002(*) 0.0002(*) 0.0001(*) 
DEMDEPS -0.0103(*) -0.0009 -0.0022 -0.001(**) -0.0006(*) 
TECHNFA 0.5813(*) 0.1637(*) -0.1587(*) -0.7769(*) -0.8415(*) 
NOW 0.0061 -0.0056(*) -0.0058(*) -0.0046(*) 0.0003 
MMDA -00052(*) -0.0014(*) -0.0031(*) -0.0015 -0.0005(*) 
SMALLCD -0.0062(*) -0.0014 -0.0027(*) -0.0017(*) 0.0003(*) 
ORIGI -0.0014(*) -0.00003 0.00004 -0.00004 -0.0007(*) 
ESCR 0.0004 0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0004(*) -0.0009(*) 
RULE -0.0002 -0.0008(**) -0.0006 -0.0009(*) -0.001(*) 
DEBIT -0.0004 -0.0005 0.0007 0.0002 0.0004(*) 
Observations N = 2, 944 N = 5,555 N = 4,885 N = 27,615 N =96,297 
R-Square R2 = 0.8 R2 = 0.78 R2 = 0.78 R2 = 0.79 R2 = 0.78 
Note: Autoregressive model with 4 lags of the dependent variable, coefficients for 4 lags of the dependent variable are not presented in the table   (*) significance at the 99% level, (**) 
significance at the 95% level. 
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Appendix C: Random effect model and autoregressive model for Change in number of employee 
Table 16: Change in number of employee is dependent variable, random effect model 
 
Variables 
Assets > $50 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $10 - $50 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $5 - $10 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $1 - $5 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets < $1 billion 
Coefficient 
Intercept 3.279 2.526 -12.893(**) -1.3868 -0.3802 
Q1 -1.0346(*) -0.7501(*) -0.8946(*) -0.6737(*) -0.2629(*) 
Q2 -0.8375(*) -0.0107 -0.1669 0.3011(*) 0.728(*) 
Q3 -0.6433(*) -0.7029(*) -0.5466(*) -0.779(*) -0.6519(*) 
LNASSETS -0.0789 -0.0432 0.9559(*) 0.2295(*) 0.1687(*) 
CAPRATIO -1.8733 -4.1885 -2.1169 -2.3323(**) -3.6386(*) 
NETINTINC 15.0561 5.4953 7.4967 9.066 -9.156(*) 
FIDUINC 16.0743 2.1236 7.5012 -3.3835 -47.1755(*) 
NONACCRU -59.6646(*) -23.5673(*) -16.3258(*) -14.7378(*) -31.5518(*) 
AGLOANS 18.229 -1.5459 -5.0299 1.5685 -0.1277 
USCNILOAN -5.7545(*) -1.6675 0.3851 0.7014 3.2734(*) 
FORCNILOAN 9.2534 0.558 -3.3995 -6.3085(**) -1.9402 
BIGCDS 1.2394 1. .4997 1.9657 2.3562(*) 1.9404(*) 
ALLL 12.62 -34.5657(**) -34.3018(**) -62.2259(*) -40.8660(*) 
PLLL -22.3785 27.5448 -17.9764 -0.4018 9.1164 
GDPGROWTH 0.0781 0.138(*) 0.0783(**) 0.1182(*) 0.093(*) 
DEMDEPS -1.4886 0.2961 -1.8963 -0.2813 1.3670(*) 
TECHNFA -309.947(*) -210.128(*) -144.793(*) -159.973(*) -68.2842(*) 
NOW 10.1643(**) -0.6423 0.9789 -0.1732 -1.7404(*) 
MMDA 0.05777 -0.897 -1.8552(*) -1.1097 -1.2315(*) 
SMALLCD 1.8323 1.5399 -1.1198 -0.4723 0.7827(*) 
ORIGI 0.5167 -0.0579 0.5332 0.0749 -0.2012 
ESCR -0.4998 0.3258 -0.2924 -0.1728 -0.5427(*) 
RULE -0.6706 -0.1751 -0.3176 -0.4683(*) -0.8236(*) 
DEBIT -0.6493 0.2181 -0.1787 0.1194 -0.068 
Observations N = 2,944 N = 5,599 N = 4,853 N = 27,726 N = 96,901 
R-Square R2 = 0.03 R2 = 0.03 R2 = 0.03 R2 = 0.03 R2 = 0.03 
Note: Random effect model estimator results (*) significance at the 99% level, (**) significance at the 95% level. 
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Table 17: Change in number of employee is dependent variable, autoregressive model 
 
Variables 
Assets > $50 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $10 - $50 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $5 - $10 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $1 - $5 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets < $1 billion 
Coefficient 
Intercept 0.7111 -0.5975 -6.7796 -2.731(*) -1.107(**) 
Q1 -0.7203(**) -0.5679(*) -0.6116(*) -0.4209(*) -0.1514(*) 
Q2 -0.6238(**) 0.0739 0.304 0.4296(*) -0.7767(*) 
Q3 -0.5398(**) -0.667(*) -0.4612(*) -0.6631(*) -0.491(*) 
LNASSETS 0.0135 0.0979 0.5099 0.2762(*) 0.1865(*) 
CAPRATIO -0.8943 -3.1881 -1.7315 -2.5288(*) -4.5631(*) 
NETINTINC 22.2499(**) 11.4002 6.1687 4.3277 -4.2255 
FIDUINC 18.7777 10.4601 -7.6369 -3.1813 -36.9311(*) 
NONACCRU -41.8299(*) -15.6617(*) -13.4869 -11.7802(*) -28.8634 
AGLOANS 13.0803 -0.7124 -2.2608 0.6398 0.2441 
USCNILOAN -4.5225(*) -0.6746 0.2074 0.3456 2.2171(*) 
FORCNILOAN 7.6928(**) -1.7173 -3.1571 -3.5811(**) -2.9095(**) 
BIGCDS 1.3781 1.2564 1.4196 2.0992(**) 2.1061(*) 
ALLL -7.4713 -30.9109(**) -17.7997 -45.6488(*) -21.7108(*) 
PLLL -19.6462 29.1064(**) -20.5434 -1.8351 7.531 
GDPGROWTH 0.081 0.1159(*) 0.0567 0.0968(*) 0.0886(*) 
DEMDEPS -1.0204 -0.6074 -1.3046 -0.3834 0.5192 
TECHNFA -198.516(**) -155.696(*) -50.7352 -86.6458(*) -52.3786(*) 
NOW 5.6645 -1.0519 -0.1798 0.4771 -1.6073(*) 
MMDA -0.7651 -0.5177 -1.0683(**) -0.4529 -0.949(*) 
SMALLCD 1.4508 0.6065 -0.8628 -0.6138 0.2207 
ORIGI 0.3485 -0.0853 0.5731 0.0613 -0.2059  
ESCR -0.4804 0.3872 -0.2329 -0.1989 -0.5312(*) 
RULE -0.6531 -0.1206 -0.1506 -0.3735(*) -0.7585(*) 
DEBIT -0.6726 0.2817 -0.2039 0.1474 0.0048 
Observations N = 2,944 N = 5,599 N = 4,853 N = 27,726 N = 96,901 
R-Square R2 = 0.04 R2 = 0.06 R2 = 0.06 R2 = 0.06 R2 = 0.05 
Note: Autoregressive model with 4 lags of the dependent variable, coefficients for 4 lags of the dependent variable are not presented in the table   (*) significance at the 99% level, (**) 
significance at the 95% level.
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Appendix D: Random effect model and autoregressive model for Salaries to assets 
Table 18: Salaries to assets is dependent variable, random effect model 
 
Variables 
Assets > $50 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $10 - $50 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $5 - $10 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $1 - $5 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets < $1 billion 
Coefficient 
Intercept 0.0246(*) 0.0345(*) 0.0087(**) 0.0189(*) 0.0058(*) 
Q1 0.0035(*) 0.005(*) 0.0029(*) 0.0033(*) 0.0023(*) 
Q2 0.0023(*) 0.0033(*) 0.0019(*) 0.0021(*) 0.0015(*) 
Q3 0.0011(*) 0.0016(*) 0.0011(*) 0.001(*) 0.0007(*) 
LNASSETS -0.0008(*) -0.0017(*) -0.0002 -0.0009(*) 0.0001(*) 
CAPRATIO 0.0049(**) 0.0131(*) 0.0138(*) 0.0096(*) 0.0059(*) 
NETINTINC 0.0907(*) 0.0804(*) 0.1715(*) 0.1257(*) 0.1389(*) 
FIDUINC 0.3558(*) 0.5794(*) 0.3275(*) 0.5488(*) 0.5518(*) 
NONACCRU 0.0274(*) 0.0288(*) 0.0274(*) 0.015(*) 0.0029(*) 
AGLOANS 0.0225 0.0023 0.046(*) -0.0019 -0.0023(*) 
USCNILOAN -0.0013 -0.0043(*) -0.0031(*) 0.0024(*) 0.0032(*) 
FORCNILOAN 0.036(*) -0.005 -0.0027 -0.0009 0.0078(*) 
BIGCDS -0.0033(**) 0.0021(**) -0.0032(*) -0.002(*) -0.0012(*) 
ALLL -0.0275(**) -0.0508(*) -0.0408(*) 0.0236(*) 0.0637(*) 
PLLL -0.003 -0.0291(*) -0.0319(*) -0.0318(*) -0.0289(*) 
GDPGROWTH 0.00006(*) -0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00004(*) -0.00004(*) 
DEMDEPS -0.0061(*) -0.0013 0.0012 0.005(*) 0.0081(*) 
TECHNFA 0.9844(*) 1.3311(*) 0.7649(*) 0.9428(*) 0.5887(*) 
NOW -0.0161(*) 0.006(*) -0.0024(**) 0.0017(*) -0.0005(**) 
MMDA -0.0022(*) 0.0008 0.0018(*) 0.003(*) 0.0027(*) 
SMALLCD -0.0149(*) -0.0064(*) -0.005(*) -0.0061(*) -0.0052(*) 
ORIGI 0.0004 -0.0005(**) -0.0003 -0.0004(*) -0.0003(*) 
ESCR 0.0006(*) 0.0002 0.0004(**) 0.0005(*) 0.0001(**) 
RULE -0.0002 -0.0005(*) -0.0002 0.000004 -0.0003(*) 
DEBIT 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0004(**) 0.00001 -0.0002(*) 
Observations N = 2,944 N = 5,599 N = 4,853 N = 27,726 N = 96,901 
R-Square R2 = 0.37 R2 = 0.4 R2 = 0.35 R2 = 0.26 R2 = 0.24 
Note: Random effect model estimator results  (*) significance at the 99% level, (**) significance at the 95% level. 
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Table 19: Salaries to assets is dependent variable, autoregressive model 
 
Variables 
Assets > $50 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $10 - $50 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $5 - $10 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets $1 - $5 billion 
Coefficient 
Assets < $1 billion 
Coefficient 
Intercept -0.00002 0.0002 0.0041(**) 0.0011(*) -0.0002 
Q1 0.0016(*) 0.0013(*) 0.0018(*) 0.0013(*) 0.0007(*) 
Q2 0.0005(*) 0.0004(*) 0.0009(*) 0.0005(*) 0.0001(*) 
Q3 0.0002(*) 0.0003(*) 0.0006(*) 0.0002(*) -0.00002 
LNASSETS -0.00001 -0.0001 -0.0004(*) -0.0002(*) -0.00002(**) 
CAPRATIO 0.002(**) 0.0013 0.0025(*) 0.0005(**) -0.0003 
NETINTINC 0.0176(*) 0.02(*) 0.0297(*) 0.0252(*) 0.0327(*) 
FIDUINC 0.0244(*) 0.032(*) 0.0292(*) 0.0229(*) 0.0436(*) 
NONACCRU 0.0101(**) 0.0102(*) 0.007(*) 0.0038(*) 0.0037(*) 
AGLOANS 0.0043 0.0009 0.002 0.0009(*) 0.0002 
USCNILOAN 0.0007 0.0004 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.00004 
FORCNILOAN -0.0021 0.0003 0.0024 0.0007 0.001(**) 
BIGCDS -0.0026(*) 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0003(*) 
ALLL -0.0118 -0.0191(*) -0.0195(*) -0.0005 -0.0009 
PLLL 0.0036 0.0009 -0.0073 0.0037 0.0069 
GDPGROWTH -0.000001 0.00002 0.000003 0.000003 0.000001 
DEMDEPS -0.0013(*) -0.0001 0.00001 -0.0004(**) -0.0001 
TECHNFA 0.2771(*) 0.1455(*) 0.2631(*) 0.1715(*) 0.0524(*) 
NOW -0.0016 0.0001 -0.00003 0.0003 -0.00005 
MMDA -0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.00004 -0.0002(*) 
SMALLCD -0.0012 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0007(*) -0.0005(*) 
ORIGI -0.0001 0.00003 0.0002 0.0001(**) 0.0002(*) 
ESCR 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003(**) 0.0002(*) 0.0003(*) 
RULE -0.0002 -0.0002(**) -0.0002 -0.00004 0.0001(**) 
DEBIT 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004(**) 0.0002(*) 0.0001(*) 
Observations N = 2,944 N = 5,599 N = 4,853 N = 27,726 N = 96,901 
R-Square R2 = 0.92 R2 = 0.96 R2 = 0.95 R2 = 0.94 R2 = 0.91 
Note: Autoregressive model with 4 lags of the dependent variable, coefficients for 4 lags of the dependent variable are not presented in the table   (*) significance at the 99% level, (**) 
significance at the 95% level. 
